

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 091651  
ORIGIN SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 R

DRAFTED BY NEA/IAI:WBSMITHII:LHW  
APPROVED BY NEA:SSOBER  
S/S:PTARNOFF

-----074661 102143Z /70

O R 102112Z APR 78  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
AMEMBASSY BEIRUT  
AMEMBASSY CAIRO  
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS

S E C R E T STATE 091651

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, IS, XF

SUBJECT: PERES ON MIDDLE EAST PEACE EFFORTS

1. DURING PERES' CALL ON THE SECRETARY APRIL 7, PERES  
EXPRESSED VIEW THAT BEGIN MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO CHANGE HIS  
STANCE ABOUT APPLICABILITY OF 242 TO WEST BANK IF EGYPT  
WOULD DECLARE THAT 242 MEANT LESS THAN TOTAL WITHDRAWAL.  
ALSO, BEGIN'S FEELING THAT U.S. AND EGYPT WERE NOT TREATING  
ISRAEL'S POSITIONS AND REQUIREMENTS "FAIRLY" IN NEGOTIA-  
TIONS WOULD HAVE TO BE OVERCOME. PERES UNDERLINED HIS OWN  
CONVICTION THAT IF BEGIN WAS TO BE ASKED TO ALTER HIS  
STANCE ON 242, EGYPT SHOULD ALSO CLARIFY ITS INTERPRETATION.  
THE SECRETARY TOLD HIM THAT HE DOUBTED SADAT COULD GO  
BEYOND IMPRECISE LANGUAGE OF 242 ITSELF, ALTHOUGH SADAT

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ACCEPTED U.S. VIEW THAT TERRITORIAL CHANGES ON WEST BANK  
WOULD BE NECESSARY, A U.S. VIEW WE COULD REPEAT PUBLICLY  
WHEN AGREEMENT ON DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES WAS REACHED.

2. PERES WAS VERY FIRM IN OPPOSING ISRAELI AGREEMENT TO  
ANY PROVISION FOR REFERENDUM OR PLEBISCITE AT END OF FIVE-  
YEAR INTERIM PERIOD, OFFERING USUAL ARGUMENTS

ABOUT SPARKING PLO-SPONSORED POLITICAL INTIMIDATION DURING INTERIM PERIOD. HE APPROVED OF ASWAN FORMULATION, BUT HE

FELT ANYTHING BEYOND IT WOULD UNDERCUT JORDAN'S ABILITY TO REASSERT ITSELF DURING INTERIM PERIOD, WHICH HE CHARACTERIZED AS U.S.-ISRAELI GOAL IN HAVING INTERIM PERIOD.

3. PERES PREDICTED THAT BEGIN GOVERNMENT WOULD NOT GIVE US BETTER ASSURANCES ON ITS PLANS FOR NEW SETTLEMENTS IN OCCUPIED TERRITORIES BUT IN PRACTICE WOULD LIMIT THIS ACTIVITY SEVERELY AS LONG AS NEGOTIATIONS CONTINUED. THE SECRETARY SAID THIS ISSUE WAS EXACERBATING SITUATION AND HAD TO BE PUT TO REST.

4. CONCERNING SOUTH LEBANON, PERES WAS NOT NEGATIVE TO IDEA OF HAVING SYRIANS MOVE DOWN TO LITANI BUT MUCH PREFERRED TO SEE UN MOVE UP TO LITANI, POINTING TO DANGER THAT SYRIANS WOULD INSTALL GROUND-TO-AIR MISSILES AND INFLAMMATORY INCIDENT COULD EASILY ENSUE. THE SECRETARY MENTIONED--AND ASKED DINITZ WHO WAS PRESENT TO NOTIFY JERUSALEM--THAT WE WERE NOW SEEKING NIGERIAN CONTINGENT FOR UNIFIL AT WALDHEIM'S REQUEST BECAUSE MEXICANS HAD BACKED OUT. THE SECRETARY ALSO NOTED THAT WALDHEIM WAS CONSIDERING ENLARGEMENT OF UNIFIL TO 6,000 MEN.

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ORIGIN SS-15

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /016 R

66011  
DRAFTED BY IO/UNA:BJSHARP  
APPROVED BY IO/UNA:JFTEFFT  
S/S-O:JTOBIN  
-----086666 112027Z /45  
O 111953Z APR 78

FM SECSTATE WASHDC  
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 091651

EXDIS FOR AMB YOUNG FROM UNA

FOL RPT STATE 091651 SENT ACTION TEL AVIV INFO AMMAN, BEIRUT,  
CAIRO & DAMASCUS DTD 10 APR 78

QUOTE: S E C R E T STATE 091651

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## Message Attributes

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**Draft Date:** 10 apr 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Decaption Note:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
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**Disposition Approved on Date:**  
**Disposition Case Number:** n/a  
**Disposition Comment:** 25 YEAR REVIEW  
**Disposition Date:** 20 Mar 2014  
**Disposition Event:**  
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**Errors:** N/A  
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**Review Release Event:** n/a  
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**Type:** TE  
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**Review Markings:**  
Sheryl P. Walter  
Declassified/Released  
US Department of State  
EO Systematic Review  
20 Mar 2014  
**Markings:** Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014